Difference between revisions 67853200 and 81098336 on enwiki

{{CriminTheo}}
In [[criminology]], '''[[public order crime]] case law in the [[United States]]''' is essential to understanding how the [[court]]s interpret the policy of laws where the [[morality|moral]] and social order of the [[state]] appears to be threatened by clearly identified behavior.

{{merge|Loving v. Virginia}}⏎
⏎
==Loving ''et ux'' v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967)==
The issue was whether Virginia's statutory scheme to use the [[criminal law]] to prevent [[marriage]]s between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violated the [[Equal Protection]] and [[Due Process]] Clauses of the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]] of the [[United States Constitution]]. The [[U.S. state]] of [[Virginia]] sought to justify the law on the ground that [[ma(contracted; show full)s, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, was surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. Warren concluded, "The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."


{{merge|Stanley v. Georgia}}⏎
⏎
==Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969)==
The issue was whether [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]]'s obscenity statute was unconstitutional in violating the [[First Amendment]] (made applicable to the States under the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]]) insofar as it punished mere private possession of obscene matter. Georgia, relying on ''Roth v. United States'', 354 U.S. 476 (1957), argued that the statute was valid on the ground that &qu(contracted; show full)
:"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."


{{merge|Miller v. California}}⏎
⏎
==Miller v California 413 U.S. 15 (1973)==
The trial judge instructed the jury to evaluate whether the materials were obscene by applying by the contemporary community standards of California. The State argued that obscene material is not protected by the [[First Amendment]] per ''Roth v. United States'', 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Chief Justice Burger said that while ''Roth'' presumed "obscenity" to be "utterly without redeeming social importance," (contracted; show full) for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus existed. Thus, each jury would apply local standards. Burger rejected the spectre of repression. He refused to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material as demeaning the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. "It is a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free press."


{{merge|Hustler Magazine v. Falwell}}⏎
⏎
==[[Hustler Magazine v. Falwell|Hustler Magazine Inc. ''et al'' v Falwell 485 U.S. 46 (1988)]]==
To protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and public officials from recovering [[damages]] for the [[tort]] of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact wh(contracted; show full)
Thus, while such a bad motive might be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited such a result in the area of public debate about public figures. If it was it to hold otherwise, there could be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject.


{{merge|Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.}}⏎
⏎
==Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560 (1991)==
The issue was whether [[Indiana]]'s public indecency law prohibiting total nudity in public places violated the First Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the law was clearly within the State's constitutional power because it furthered a substantial governmental interest in protecting societal order and morality. Public indecency statutes reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places, and thi(contracted; show full)lia upheld the law in that moral opposition to nudity provided a rational basis for prohibiting nude dancing. While Justice Souter said that the State's interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since the pernicious effects were merely associated with nude dancing establishments and were not the result of the expression inherent in nude dancing. Indeed, the law required little when measured against the dancer's remaining capacity and opportunity to express an erotic message.


{{merge|Jacobson v. United States}}⏎
⏎
==[[Jacobson v. United States|Jacobson v United States 503 U.S. 540 (1992)]]==
The issue was the extent to which the Government may [[solicitation|solicit]] or [[entrapment|entrap]] the commission of an offense. Jacobson was not simply offered the opportunity to order pornography, after which he promptly availed himself of that opportunity. He was the target of 26 months of repeated Government mailings and communications. Justice White said that there was no dispute about the evils of child pornography or t(contracted; show full)n when they disapprove of it. This obedience may reflect a generalized respect for legality or the fear of prosecution, but, for whatever reason, the law's prohibitions are matters of consequence. The fact that the Petitioner gave ready support to organizations claiming to oppose censorship cannot be enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was predisposed, prior to the Government acts intended to create predisposition, to commit the crime of receiving child pornography through the mails.


{{merge|Reno v. ACLU}}⏎
⏎
==Reno, Attorney General of the United States ''et al'' v American Civil Liberties Union ''et  al'' No. 96-511. Argued March 19, 1997. Decided June 26, 1997==
Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act) seek to protect minors from harmful material on the [[Internet]]. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1997) criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as meas(contracted; show full)nd manner regulation because it was a content-based blanket restriction on speech. Although the Government had an interest in protecting children from potentially harmful materials, the CDA pursued that interest by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults had a constitutional right to send and receive. Its breadth was wholly unprecedented would be an unacceptable burden on adult speech if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the Act's legitimate purposes.


{{merge|Lawrence v. Texas}}⏎
⏎
==Lawrence et al v Texas No. 02-102. Argued March 26, 2003. Decided June 26, 2003==
The issue was whether Texas Penal Code Ann. §21.06(a) (2003) forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy said that "Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other sph(contracted; show full) involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime."

[[Category:Criminology]]
[[Category:United States case law]]